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LONG TERM CARE AFTER OLMSTEAD V.
L.C.: WILL THE POTENTIAL OF THE ADA'S
INTEGRATION MANDATE BE ACHIEVED?
Loretta Williams*
INTRODUCTION
When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) on July 26, 1990, he said, "Let the shameful walls of exclusion
finally come tumbling down."' The ADA promised 43,000,000 Americans
with disabilities an end to discrimination in all aspects of life -
employment, government services, transportation and public
accommodation in privately owned businesses - and provided mechanismsS 2
to enforce that promise. The ADA reads, "[H]istorically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite
some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."3 The
ADA cites institutionalization - providing services in nursing homes,
mental hospitals and other institutions - as a continuing form of
discrimination against people with disabilities.4
Nine years after the ADA's enactment, the Supreme Court in Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring' confirmed that unjustified isolation of a person
with disabilities in an institution is discrimination based upon disability.
This case was brought by L.C., a woman with mental impairments who
was admitted voluntarily to a public psychiatric hospital in Georgia.
Although the state's treatment professionals deemed community care
appropriate for L.C. in 1993, the state did not move her to a community
program until nearly three years later. L.C. claimed that the state violated
her rights under the ADA by segregating her in an institution rather than
providing community services.' The state argued that discrimination only
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America.
1. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N AND U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 1 (1992).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
5. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
6. See id. at 593-94.
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exists where a person with disabilities is treated differently from people
who do not have disabilities, and that L.C. was not denied community
services based upon her disability, but because the community program
lacked sufficient funding. The Supreme Court held that the state did
discriminate against L.C. and remanded the case for "further
consideration of the appropriate relief, given the range of facilities the
State maintains for the care and treatment of persons with [disabilities]."8
This case has profound implications for the way that people with
disabilities receive long term care (LTC) services from the government.9
Traditionally, people with disabilities were removed from society and
placed in state psychiatric hospitals, institutions for the mentally retarded
or nursing homes.0 This institutional bias remains in publicly funded
programs, despite a continuing push by disability advocates for additional
services in the community, and efforts by state and federal policymakers
to expand these programs. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court told state
governments, which design and administer LTC services for people with
disabilities, that unnecessary institutionalization violates the ADA. Will
this holding remedy the current situation where more than 75% of public
LTC expenditures support institutional care?"
This Note explores the potential impact of Olmstead on the delivery of
publicly-funded long term care in the United States. Part I presents the
context in which Olmstead was decided: it briefly describes the relevant
7. See id. at 594-95.
8. Id. at 587.
9. This Note focuses on LTC services for adults with disabilities. While there
are some programs that serve both adults and children, for the most part LTC
services are financed and delivered differently for children and adults.
10. See ADA Handbook - History, available at
http://www.dinf.ch/ada/ada-preamble.htm (Dec. 16, 1997). The preamble briefly
describes the history of care for people with disabilities in the United States.
Families bore the primary responsibility for care during the colonial period, with
care shifting toward custodial institutions in the early 19th century. Early in the
20th century the first rehabilitation programs began in response to the increase in
the number of people with physical disabilities caused by World War I and an
increase in industrial accidents. Emphasis on rehabilitation and re-entering the
community increased after World War II and, in the past three decades, disability
policy has moved toward integration of people with disabilities into mainstream
society. See id. For a more thorough discussion of trends in services for people
with disabilities, see generally NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE (1986) and U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING
THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).
11. See BARBARA COLEMAN, AARP, TRENDS IN MEDICAID LONG-TERM
CARE SPENDING 2 (1999).
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sections of the ADA and implementing regulations, institutional bias in
the current long term care system and legislative proposals to end bias
through changes in the Medicaid program. Next, it examines two cases,
Easley v. Snider12 and Helen L. v. DiDario,"3 that provided important
precedent for Olmstead and summarizes the Olmstead decision. Part II
analyzes the decision in terms of balancing individual versus collective
rights and defining fundamental alteration. Part III argues that, while
Olmstead makes a powerful promise that all qualified people with
disabilities will be served in existing community programs, the holding's
impact is limited because it operates within a system biased toward
institutional care. This Comment recommends legislative change at the
national level to encourage states to realize Olmstead's potential for
people with disabilities.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title I of the ADA Requires States to Provide LTC Services in
the Most Integrated Setting
The ADA provides "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.'
14
Disability is defined broadly as a physical or mental condition that
substantially limits one or more major life activities. The ADA builds
upon earlier civil rights laws for people with disabilities, notably, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1' The ADA adopts, and is consistent with,
key provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, yet adds more protection for
people with disabilities who use public LTC services because it specifically
names isolation and segregation as forms of discrimination.17 Congress
12. 36 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 1994).
13. 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania Sec'y of
Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
16. See 29 U.S.C.A. 794 (1999). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities by public or private
organizations that receive federal funds. See 29 U.S.C.A. 794(a) (1999). Title II of
the ADA repeats the anti-discrimination language of Section 504 and extends it to
state governments and other public entities that do not receive federal financial
assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). The ADA required the Attorney
General to implement Title II through regulations that are consistent with Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
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found that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as... institutionalization [and] health services"" and
that people with disabilities "continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion... [and]
segregation."19 The ADA urges the nation to end discrimination against
people with disabilities and "assure quality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals. 2
Title II of the ADA protects individuals from discrimination by state
governments and other public entities. It says that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity., 2' A qualified individual with a disability is someone who,
"with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or
practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
[government program or service]. 22 Title II does not define "reasonable
modifications" or "essential eligibility requirements."3
The state's duty to provide reasonable modifications to qualified
people with disabilities is not unlimited. The regulations implementing
Title II do not require modifications where the state "can demonstrate
that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program or activity. 24 The terms "reasonable modification" and
"fundamental alteration" are inextricably related: a request for a change
in a program policy is either a reasonable modification that must be
granted or, if unreasonable, can be denied because it would
fundamentally alter the program. The regulations do not offer guidance
on where to draw the line between reasonable modification and
fundamental alteration in the context of the provision of public services.
Other sections of the ADA suggest ways to define the boundary
between reasonable modification and fundamental alteration. Under
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). While this provision covers all programs,
services and activities offered by a wide array of public entities, the term "state" is
used in this paper to focus attention on the duties of the state in providing LTC
services to people with disabilities.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
24. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999).
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Title I, an employer can refuse to make accommodations for an applicant
or employee with disabilities when doing so would create an "undue
hardship," defined as a "significant difficulty or expense" for the
employer. 25 The Rehabilitation Act regulations describe several factors
used to determine whether an accommodation creates an undue hardship:
the overall size of the program with respect to number of employees,
number and type of facilities and budget, the type of operation including
the composition and structure of the workforce, and the nature and cost
of the accommodation needed.26 Title II uses an analogous test for
determining the limit of a public entity's duty to remove architectural
barriers.2' To demonstrate an undue burden or fundamental alteration,
the state must consider "all resources available for use in the funding and
operation" of the program in question. 8
The Title II regulations include a provision known as the "integration
mandate" which states that "public entity shall administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities., 29  One commentator
notes: "[The] integration mandate doesn't create a right to services or
treatment, but it attaches to benefit programs that are already there and
that the states are already doing. Like an adverb - it tells them how they
have to do this program. ' 3° The plaintiff's theory in Olmstead was that
failure to provide community services caused unnecessary isolation, which
amounts to discrimination under the ADA.31
Another provision in the Title II regulations allows a public entity to
provide "benefits, services, or advantages to individuals with disabilities,
or to a particular class of individuals with disabilities beyond those
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
26. See 45 C.F.R § 84.12 (a),(c) (2000).
27. See 28 C.F.R § 35.150(a)(3) (1999).
28. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (1999). This requirement sets a higher standard
than the "readily achievable" standard for retrofitting by non-governmental public
accommodations found in Title III and is analogous to the statutory definition of
undue hardship in Title I. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N
AND U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 11-57 and 111-39.
29. 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d) (1999). This language is virtually identical to the
Department of Health and Human Services regulation implementing Section 504.
See 45 C.F.R. 85.21(d) (1999) ("The agency shall administer programs and
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with handicaps.") Id.
30. Melinda Bird, The Integration of the ADA and the Problem of
Deinstitutionalization, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 847, 848 (1998).
31. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1999).
2000]
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required by this part. 3 2 It supports the notion that states may provide
programs for a class of individuals with disabilities without providing the
same services to other individuals with disabilities.
B. Medicaid Law is Biased Toward Funding Institutional Care
Public funding for long term care is provided through the Medicaid
program, which serves people with low incomes.33 Medicaid is financed
jointly by federal and state governments and administered by the states
within the bounds of federal law.34 The structure of the Medicaid program
sustains an "institutional bias" in delivery of LTC services in that
Medicaid law encourages states to the finance institutional care rather• 35
than community services. Medicaid covers LTC services for three groups
32. 28 C.F.R. § 130(c). This section, too, is in conformity with the Section 504
regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 85.21(c) (1999).
33. HARRIET L. KoMISAR AND JUDITH FEDER, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED LONG-TERM CARE INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES 2 (1999). "Medicaid is the largest source of long-term care financing,
followed by private out-of-pocket spending." Id. In 1998, Medicaid paid for 39%,
individuals for 29%, and Medicare for 18% of $117.1 billion in national spending
for nursing home and home care. See NATALIE GRAVES TUCKER, ET. AL., AARP
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, LONG-TERM CARE 2 (2000). "While Medicaid
provides safety net coverage for [LTC], people must first exhaust their financial
resources to become eligible for the program." Id. at 1. In 1999, Medicare
spending was expected to exceed $200 billion, financing health care services for 34
million elderly and five million disabled beneficiaries. See THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (1999). But Medicare's
coverage of long term care is limited: the program only covers recuperation in a
skilled nursing facility for up to 100 days following a hospital stay and home health
care following a hospitalization or nursing home stay. See id. States independently
fund long term care programs for people with disabilities, but these programs tend
to be much smaller than the states' Medicaid programs. A national study of
programs serving older people with disabilities documented $1.2 billion in state
funding for these programs. See ENID KASSNER AND LORETTA WILLIAMS, AARP,
TAKING CARE OF THEIR OWN: STATE-FUNDED HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
CARE PROGRAMS FOR OLDER PERSONS 5 (1997).
34. See ENID KASSNER AND NATALIE GRAVES TUCKER, AARP, MEDICAID
AND LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE 1 (1998). See also BARBARA
COLEMAN, AARP, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATE LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEMS ii
(2d ed. 1998). "The country's long-term care system is actually 50 different state
and five U.S. territory systems. In the absence of a national long-term care
program, states have developed their own long-term care programs and services,
using federal Medicaid ... funds and state general revenues." Id.
35. See Memorandum from Charlene Harrington, Univ. of Cal. San
Francisco, A Review of Statutes and Regulations for Personal Care and Home
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of adults with disabilities: elderly and younger adults with physical
disabilities, adults with mental retardation or developmental disabilities
(MR/DD), and adults with mental illness.36  Although the services
available to each group vary, in all cases there are barriers to providing
community-based care through Medicaid.
1. Medicaid Favors Nursing Home Care for Adults with
Physical Disabilities
Physically disabled Medicaid beneficiaries who need LTC are entitled
to nursing home care, but may be denied access to community services.
Under Medicaid law, states must provide nursing home care to adults with
disabilities who qualify for it, but community-based LTC services are
optional and may require special permission from the federal
government.37
In addition, Medicaid allows states to offer more generous financial
eligibility to people seeking nursing home care than to those who want
38services in the community. In 1996, Medicaid funded nursing home care
and Community Based Services: A Final Report 1 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter
Harrington].
Historically, services for people with disabilities have been structured
according to a medical and custodial model, which viewed persons with
disabilities as sick and vulnerable and needing to be cared for and
separated from society .... Used indiscriminately, this model has
resulted in excessive segregation, institutionalization and
dependence .... This was further reinforced when the Medicaid
program established nursing home as a mandatory benefit. Id.
36. Other groups served by Medicaid LTC include children with special
health care needs, people with AIDS, and people with brain injuries. See generally
Erin Nagy and Lee Partridge, Home- and Community-Based Waivers: A Look at
the States in 1998, WASHINGTON MEMO, Mar.-Apr. 1999.
37. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 1-2. See also ANDY SCHNEIDER ET. AL.,
THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR THE ELDERLY 4-5
(1999) (discussing the meaning of the terms "mandatory" and "optional" as used
in reference to the Medicaid program.) "State participation in Medicaid is
voluntary." Id. at 5. If they choose to participate, states must provide basic
benefits to certain populations. States may offer additional benefits or offer
benefits to other groups that are defined in federal law.
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(3), 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (2000). Medicaid's
financial eligibility criteria differ for institutional and community-based services.
Generally speaking, in 1999 an individual with a disability who lived in the
community could get Medicaid if his income were no more than $500 per month
(the income limit for the federal Supplemental Security Income program) while
states could allow an individual to qualify for institutional LTC if his income were
20001
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for about 1.6 million people.39
States can adopt Medicaid's personal care option to provide LTC
services to physically disabled adults who live in the community.40 This
service includes assistance with dressing, bathing and other activities of
daily living.41 If the state chooses to offer personal care, an entitlement is
created for all individuals who meet the medical necessity criteria for the
service, yet the personal care option is not equivalent to nursing home
services.4' The financial eligibility standard for this program is lower than
for nursing home services, therefore, some people are denied personal
care even though they meet the financial eligibility criteria for nursing
home care.43  In most states, the personal care benefit is less
comprehensive than nursing home care and is targeted to beneficiaries
who are less disabled than nursing home residents. 4 Thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia provide optional personal care services.45
Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) waiver programs are
41quite different. Congress authorized the waiver programs in 1981 "[t]o
provide an alternative to the 'institutional bias' of the Medicaid program"
by providing services in the community to people who would otherwise
reside in a nursing home, hospital or facility for the mentally retarded 7
up to $1,500 per month (or 300% of the limit under the Supplemental Security
Income program). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10(A)(ii)(VI), § 1396b(f)(4)(c)
(2000). For a more complete discussion of income eligibility for Medicaid, see
generally Harrington, supra note 35, at 6.
39. See Medicaid Recipients by Type of Service (last visited Jan. 21, 1998)
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/2082-4.htm.
40. See 42 U.S.C. 1396d (2000). See also Harrington, supra note 35, at 12.
41. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID
MANUAL, Part 4, § 4480.
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(24), 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396a(a)(1),
1396a(a)(10)(B) (2000).
43. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 6. The Administration's FY 2001
Budget proposes to allow states to set income eligibility for personal care services
at 300% of the Supplemental Security Income limit, as they can for nursing home
services. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES FY2001 BUDGET at 69.
This option is estimated to cost $140 million over five years. Id. at 75.
44. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 28-34.
45. See Id. at 12.
46. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 103 CONG., 1ST SESS.,
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (Comm. Print
103-A 1993).
47. Remarks by Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing
Administration to the Administration of Developmental Disabilities
Commissioner's Forum, Apr. 18, 1997 http://www.hcfa.gov/speech/ddspeech.htm
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States with HCBS waivers can provide an array of supportive services,
such as adult day programs, assistive devices or respite care, that are
necessary to allow an individual to live in the community but are
48
otherwise unavailable through the Medicaid program. Waiver programs
can use the same financial eligibility standards used for nursing home
49
services.
Waiver programs are limited in ways that nursing home services are
not. HCBS waivers are optional for the state, require special approval
from the federal government, and must cost no more than institutional
care.50 For beneficiaries, the major shortcoming of HCBS waivers is that
they do not create an entitlement to services: the state sets a limit on the
number of people it will serve5' and is not required to offer services state-
52wide. Many waiver programs have waiting lists of individuals who are
eligible for services but are not being served. 3 All fifty states operate one
or more HCBS waiver programs for older people and/or younger adults
with physical disabilities." In 1997, these waivers served 326,000 people at
(visited Jan. 3, 2000).
48. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 60. HCBS waiver programs also may
cover services provided in residential care settings, such as assisted living
residences for older people. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.310(a)(2) (1999). While
Medicaid can pay for services provided in community residential settings,
beneficiaries are responsible for the cost of rent and meals. See Id.
49. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 13.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2000). The aggregate per capita cost of
HCBS waiver services may not exceed the aggregate per capita cost that the state
would incur in the absence of the waiver (i.e. if people were served in institutions).
See id. See also Harrington, supra note 35, at 60.
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.303(f)(6) (1999).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §1396n(c)(3) (2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(a)(2)
(1999).
53. See Harrington, supra note 35, at 63-66. Waiting lists typically develop in
two ways: (1) enrollment in the waiver reaches the limit set by the state and
approved by HCFA, or (2) enrollment has not reached the limit but the state has
not appropriated sufficient funds to operate the waiver at full capacity. See id. at
66. States sometimes use their own funding to provide community-based care for
those who are waiting for waiver services. "A majority of [state-funded programs
for older persons] serve people who are on waiting lists for other Medicaid
services: 33 of 54 programs serve people on waiting lists for Medicaid waiver
services and 31 of 54 programs serve people on waiting lists for a nursing home
bed." Kassner and Williams, supra note 33, at 6.
54. See STEVEN LUTZKY, ET. AL., THE LEWIN GROUP, REVIEW OF MEDICAID
1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM
LITERATURE AND PROGRAM DATA 6 (2000). Arizona operates an HCBS program
2000]
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a cost to the states and federal government of $1.7 billion.5
2. Medicaid for People with Mental Retardation or
Developmental Disabilities: Progress Toward Community Care
Until the 1970s, states had primary responsibility for providing services
to people with mental retardation or developmental disabilities. Concern
about quality of care in state institutions encouraged Congress to amend
Medicaid in 1971 to allow states to fund intermediate care facilities for
people with mental retardation (ICF/MR)." An ICF/MR is an institution
serving four or more residents that provides ongoing evaluation, 24-hour
supervision, and rehabilitative services "to help individuals function at
their greatest ability." 7
Like personal care services, ICF/MR services are optional, however,
once adopted by the state, they create an individual entitlement to care in
this setting. States may use the more generous financial eligibility criteria
available to nursing home applicants for ICF/MR applicants.
5 8
Nationwide, an estimated 129,000 people receive services in 7,400
ICFs/MR. More than half of these people are served in facilities with
more than fifty residents. 9
States have used HCBS waivers to finance a variety of community
supports, including prevocational services and supported employment for
people with developmental disabilities. 6° As noted earlier, HCBS waivers
can offer the more generous financial institutional eligibility criteria, but
may not be available statewide and may have long waiting lists for
that is similar to other states but authorized through a different statutory
provision. See id.
55. See id. at 9-10.
56. See Congressional Research Serv., supra note 46, at 64.
57. 42 C.F.R. § 440.150 (1999). See also Background and Milestones:
Intermediate Care Facilities for People with Mental Retardation, available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/icfmr/icfbkgd.htm (May 5, 1999).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(ii)(V) - (VI) (2000).
59. See ICF/MR Program Trends (visited Aug. 2, 2000)
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/icfmr/icftrend.htm. The size of ICFs/MR have been
declining since the 1970s. The average number of people served per ICF/MR
declined from 185 in 1977 to 23 in 1992. Despite this decline, "the majority of
people served by the program still reside in large public ICFs/MR (as of June
1996, 88% of facilities had 16 or fewer certified beds, but 63% of the people
served lived in facilities that served 17 or more people, and 57% of all people
served lived in facilities that served more than 50 people.)" Id.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 440.180(c)
(1999).
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services.61 In 1998, state and federal governments spent more than $7
billion on HCBS waiver services for an estimated 240,321 people with
mental retardation or developmental disabilities. 2
3. Medicaid Provides Limited Services for People with
Mental Illness
Historically, state governments were solely responsible for services for• 63
people with mental illness. Medicaid law perpetuates this trend by
prohibiting states from using Medicaid to fund institutional mental health
services for adults age twenty-two through sixty-four, a provision known
as the "IMD exclusion."6  State Medicaid programs may provide
institutional care for elders and children with mental illnesses.
In 1986, Congress amended the Medicaid HCBS waiver program to
permit states to offer community-based services to people with mental
illness but retained the IMD exclusion. 65 As a result, HCBS waiver
services are available to non-elderly adults only if they would otherwise
61. The Arc, an advocacy organization for people with mental retardation,
has documented the size of waiting lists for HCBS waivers and other community
service programs for people with mental retardation. In 1987, The Arc reported
that, nationwide, approximately 139,673 people with mental retardation were
waiting to receive one or more community services. This is somewhat of an over-
estimate because some people were on more than one waiting list. Ten years later
the Arc found a total of 223,562 people with mental retardation waiting for
community services. See SHARON DAVIS ET. AL., THE ARC, A STATUS REPORT TO
THE NATION ON PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION WAITING FOR COMMUNITY
SERVICES 2 (1997).
62. See DEWAYNE DAVIS ET. AL., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 23, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Forum/pub6683.htm
(visited May 25, 2000). MR/DD waiver programs cost more than aged/disabled
waiver programs but serve fewer clients. The MR/DD waiver programs spend per
client than the aged/disabled waiver programs. In 1997, the average cost per client
in MR/DD waiver programs was $29,120 and the average cost per client in
aged/disabled waiver programs was $5989. See Lutsky, supra note 54, at 12-13.
63. See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No.
98-536). See also Congressional Research Serv., supra note 46, at 67.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27)(B) (2000). The statute prohibits payment
for services to "Institutions for Mental Disease," defined as any residential setting
with more than 16 beds which primarily provides services to people with mental
illness. Id.
65. Brief for Respondent at 3, n.3, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No.
98-536). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(4) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180(d) (1999).
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be served in an ICF/MR, nursing home or non-psychiatric hospital. 66 Only
one state has attempted to operate such a waiver.67
Two optional Medicaid services are important for providing mental
health services to adults with serious mental illness. Thirty-nine states
68
offer psychiatric rehabilitation services. Twenty-six states have opted to
target case management services to adults with mental illness.69
4. Medicaid Spending Reflects the Law's Institutional Bias
In 1999, total federal and state Medicaid spending for LTC was $62.4
billion. Of this, 74% purchased institutional care ($36.4 billion for nursing
home and $9.6 billion for ICF/MR care.) The 26% spent on community-
based care included HCBS waiver programs ($10.6 billion), personal care
($3.5 billion) and home health care ($2.2 billion). 70 These figures actually
represent a dramatic increase in the provision of community care over the
past ten years: "[H]ome care spending as a percentage of total Medicaid
long term care spending more than doubled - from 10.8 percent in 1987 to
24.0 percent in 1997 .71
C. Legislative Proposals for Expanding Community Services in
Medicaid
Two recent proposals for reforming the Medicaid program suggest
ways to expand access to community-based services for people with
disabilities. These proposals attempt to place community services on
equal footing with institutional care. They do not address the needs of the
large population of people with disabilities who are less severely impaired
and, therefore, would not qualify for institutional care.
66. See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, UNDER COURT
ORDER: THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN OLMSTEAD v. L.C. 13 (1999).
67. See id. Colorado has an HCBS waiver for individuals with serious mental
illness who would otherwise reside in a nursing facility. Id.
68. See id. at 8. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13).
69. See BAZELON CENTER, supra note 66, at 9. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(g)
(2000).
70. See PAMELA DOTY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COST-
EFFECTIVENESS OF HOME AND COMMUNITY LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES 1-3
(2000), at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/costeff.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2000). Home health care services include skilled nursing, home health aides,
medical supplies and therapeutic care. States must offer home health care to
Medicaid beneficiaries who are eligible for nursing home care. See COLEMAN,
supra note 11, at 1.
71. Id. at 2.
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In 1997, Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin introduced S. 879,
proposing a community LTC program similar to the Medicaid and state-
funded programs available in his home state.72 This bill would have
allowed states to provide community services through their Medicaid
programs without a waiver and without creating an individual entitlement
to community benefits." A national standard would replace state
discretion to determine what degree of impairment requires institutional
74 75care, however, states would still decide what services are provided.
This approach would revamp current HCBS waiver authority: special
federal permission and cost-neutrality would no longer be required but
states would retain flexibility in designing services and the ability to limit
the number of people in the program.
The Medicaid Community Attendant Services and Supports Act
(MiCASSA), developed by disability advocacy groups, was introduced
late in 1999 by Senators Tom Harkin of Iowa and Arlen Specter of
76Pennsylvania. This bill would require states to provide community
services to people with disabilities who qualify for nursing home or
ICF/MR care.77  The services provided under MiCASSA include
assistance with activities of daily living and household management,
72. See Russ Feingold, Fighting for Wisconsin Families, at
http://www.senate.gov/-feingold/families.html (visited Feb. 4, 2000). See also
Long Term Care Reform and Deficit Reduction Act of 1997, S. 879, 105th Cong.
73. See S. 879 § 101(b), § 102(b) (1999).
74. See S. 879 § 103(a). People who, because of a physical or cognitive
impairment, need assistance with three or more activities of daily living and those
with severe or profound mental retardation would be eligible for services. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services would develop a protocol for
determining disability. See id.
75. See S. 879, § 104(a) (1999).
76. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14,642 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1999) (statement of
Senator Specter). The disability groups first proposed the Medicaid Community
Attendant Services Act (MiCASA), which was introduced by former Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-
Mo.) in 1997. The groups redesigned and renamed the Medicaid Community
Attendant Services and Supports Act (MiCASSA) in 1999, to clarify its intent to
serve equally people with physical and cognitive disabilities. Reintroduction of
MiCASSA was delayed until Olmstead was decided. See Update on MiCASSA,
June 1, 1999, at www.adapt.org/casa/update.htm (visited Oct. 12, 1999).
77. See 145. Cong. Rec. S14,637 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1999) (statement of
Senator Harkin). Unlike the Feingold bill, MiCASSA retains the current
Medicaid law provision that allows states to define who is eligible for nursing
home or ICF/MR care. See Medicaid Community Attendant Services and
Supports Act of 1999, S. 1935, 106th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2000).
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similar to the current personal care option, but with an emphasis on the
ability of the personal care attendant to accompany the individual with
disabilities in the community (to school, work, etc). The bill excludes
assistive devices and home modifications, services currently provided by
781some states through HCBS waivers. Unlike the current personal care
option or HCBS waiver program, MiCASSA creates a "quasi-
entitlement" to services. The bill specifically requires states to give
individuals who qualify for institutional care the choice of receiving
services in the community instead. Yet, this choice is only guaranteed if
the aggregate federal spending on community services does not exceed
• • • 79
what would have been spent on institutional care for those beneficiaries.
If federal spending is higher, the state may limit the program by denying
entry to additional beneficiaries or through other unspecified measures.8O
D. Challenging the LTC System Through the ADA: Precursors to
Olmstead
Two Third Circuit cases set the stage for the Supreme Court's decision
in Olmstead by tackling the issue of whether the ADA's integration
mandate requires states to provide LTC services in the community.
Easley v. Snider found no violation of the ADA when two cognitively
impaired women living in an institution were denied placement in a
community program for physically impaired people who are mentally
alert."' In Helen L. v. DiDario, a physically disabled and mentally alert
nursing home resident sought placement in the same community82
program. Here, the denial of community care was a violation of the
ADA.
8 3
Easley v. Snider Plaintiff Tracey Easley suffered a head injury in a car
accident which left her with little mobility and no ability to speak.8 She
could communicate with her family through facial expressions and
blinking, but could not communicate sufficiently to manage a personal
care worker by herself. A second plaintiff, Florence Howard, had
multiple sclerosis and undifferentiated schizophrenia. She needed
78. See S. 1935, § 3(b)(1)(B) (2000).
79. See id.
80. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14,642 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1999) (statement of
Senator Specter).
81. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 306 (3rd Cir. 1994).
82. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 327-29 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub
nom. Penn. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
83. See 46 F.3d at 336.
84. See Easley, 36 F.3d at 299.
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attendant services to help with physical tasks and a surrogate to help
manage the attendant.85  Ms. Easley and Ms. Howard were denied
admissiion to Pennsylvania's state-funded Attendant Care Program
because it only serves mentally alert adults who can direct their own
services.86  The plaintiffs challenged the program requirement that
beneficiaries must be mentally alert and able to manage their attendant
services independently, but did not contest the state's assertion that they
81required surrogates to direct their attendant services. In fact, Ms. Easley
received attendant care services funded by the state program for several
years, because the agency that served her allowed her mother to act as a
surrogate.8'
Idell S., the plaintiff in Helen L. and the mother of two children, was
89paralyzed from the waist down from infection with meningitis. She
needed assistance with bathing, getting in and out of bed, and some
household chores, but could perform most of her dressing/grooming tasks
and could cook independently." Idell S. was eligible for the Attendant
Care Program, but was placed on a waiting list for services because the
program lacked sufficient funding to serve all applicants.9'
The common question in Easley and Helen L. is whether the plaintiffs
are qualified individuals with disabilities. The Attendant Care Program
requires participants to self-direct their own services, i.e. the participant
hires, trains, and discharges his or her personal care attendant.92 Helen L.
Plaintiff Idell S. met the criteria for participation in the program, thus was
clearly a qualified individual with a disability.9 Ms. Easley and Ms.
Howard did not meet the program's stated criteria of mental alertness.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 299-300.
87. See id.
88. See id. In 1991, Ms. Easley moved to an area served by a different agency
that did not allow her to use a surrogate. Id.
89. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub
nom. Pennsylvania Sec'y of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995). (Helen
L., the initial plaintiff, was discharged from the nursing home and subsequently
dropped her ADA claim. The case was continued by Beverly D. and Ilene F. who
joined as plaintiffs with Helen L. in 1992. They, too, left the nursing home and
dismissed their claims. Idell S., who intervened in the lawsuit in 1994, was still in
the nursing home when the case was decided by the Third Circuit early in 1995.)
See id. at 327-28.
90. See id. at 328.
91. See id. at 329.
92. See Easley, 36 F.3d at 299.
93. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329.
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Easley illustrates how the state's fundamental alteration defense can be
evaluated when the plaintiff needs reasonable accommodation to meet
the state program's eligibility criteria. The Easley court had to determine
whether use of a surrogate was a reasonable accommodation that would
allow the plaintiffs to obtain the program's benefits or was a fundamental
alteration of the program. If the mental alertness requirement goes to the
"essential nature of the program," the use of a surrogate would be a
fundamental alteration of the program and would not be required.94 If
mental alertness is not essential to obtaining the benefits of the program,
the modification requested by the plaintiffs is reasonable and the state
must allow use of the surrogate.9
To determine whether the requirement was essential to the purpose of
the program, the court evaluated both the stated purposes and benefits of
the program and the actual services it offered.96 The Third Circuit was
convinced that the benefit of the program went beyond simply receiving
personal care from an attendant and that an individual's control over the
provision of personal care was an essential benefit unattainable by
someone acting through a surrogate.97 Thus, "[a]llowing a decision by a
surrogate is at complete odds with the program objectives" and would
fundamentally alter the program.98
Oddly, the Third Circuit did not consider a key fact about Tracey
Easley - she had participated in the Attendant Care Program for four
years. The court excluded Ms. Easley's experience as a program
participant from its evaluation of the actual services provided by the
attendant care program. Because she was able to communicate her
preferences to her mother, who could then inform the attendant, Ms.
Easley did exercise individual control over the provision of personal care
through use of a surrogate.
99
94. Easley, 36 F.3d at 302.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 300-304.
97. See id. at 303.
98. Id. at 304.
99. A related issue in Easley was whether the mental alertness requirement
discriminated against the class of people who are both physically and cognitively
impaired. The ADA requires compliance with its non-discrimination provisions,
but allows states to offer additional benefits or advantages to specific classes of
people with disabilities. See 28 CFR § 35.130(c) (1999). The court used its
analysis of the essential nature of the program to determine whether the mental
alertness requirement discriminated against individuals with mental disabilities or
was used to provide additional benefits to the class of individuals with physical
disabilities. Because mental alertness was deemed essential to attaining the
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Helen L. directly considers whether the ADA's integration mandate
requires states to provide community-based services to qualified
individuals with disabilities. Idell S. claimed that the state violated the
ADA's requirement to provide services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to her needs.)° The court examined the history and language
of the ADA, observing that Congress required its regulations to adhere to
the principles of the Sec. 504.1 This reaffirmed the validity of the
integration mandate in the context of the ADA, a much broader civil
rights law than the Rehabilitation Act. In enacting the ADA Congress
clearly defined unnecessary segregation as impermissible discrimination
against people with disabilities. The court concluded that the state had
an obligation to serve Idell S. in the community unless doing so would
require a fundamental alteration to the community program.
In Helen L., the Third Circuit court rejected a fundamental alteration
defense based upon the state's system of financing services for people
with disabilities. The state argued that it could not provide a community
placement for Idell S. because the administering agency lacked sufficient
funding in the community program to admit her.' °  Under the state
constitution, the head of the agency could not transfer funds appropriated
by the legislature for nursing home services into the budget for
community services. The court was unconvinced by this argument.
The court noted that the stated purpose of the Attendant Care
Program, increasing the availability of community services for people with
disabilities, is similar to the goal of the ADA's integration mandate.05
Providing Idell S. services in her own home placed no undue burden on
the state, but "merely requires [the state] to fulfill its own obligations
under state law."'O° The court rejected the state's claim of inadequate
funds, observing that providing services to Idell S. in her home would save
program's benefits, the Third Circuit held that the attendant care program offered
an additional benefit to physically disabled people who are capable of self-
direction without discriminating against those who have both physical and
cognitive impairments. See Easley at 302-06.
100. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 330-33.
103. See id. at 336.
104. See id. at 320. The cost of nursing home care was $45,000 per year, of
which the state paid $19,800 (the rest was paid by the federal government through
the Medicaid program). The average cost per person in the community program
was $10,500 per year. See id.
105. See id. at 337-38.
106. Id.
20001
222 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:205
the state an average of $34,500 per year.' °7 The court added that the
Pennsylvania legislature falls within the purview of the ADA and has a
duty to properly finance its nursing home and community programs.108
Because the state offered community services for which the plaintiff was
qualified, and failed to show that providing such services constituted a
fundamental alteration of the program or undue burden on the state, the
court held that it must serve Idell S. in the community.09
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Helen L.," ° the case
attracted national attention and set the stage for the Court's decision in
Olmstead. The federal government made its first pronouncement on how
the courts should interpret the integration mandate in an amicus brief
submitted on behalf of the plaintiff in Helen L."' When Olmstead arose
from the Eleventh Circuit seeking guidance on the same part of the law,
twenty-two states signed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to
hear the case." 2 The Court granted certiorari because of the importance
of the issue to individuals and states."3 In the Olmstead opinion, the
Court accepts, in large part, the federal government's interpretation of the
integration mandate as articulated in its amicus brief for the plaintiff in
Helen L.
E. Summary of Olmstead
Lois Curtis, now known nationally as "L.C.," is a thirty-one year old
Georgia citizen with mild mental retardation and schizophrenia. First
hospitalized for psychiatric care at age fourteen when her disabilities
caused behavior that her mother could not manage, she moved in and out
of the state mental hospital eighteen times in fourteen years. While the
state provided L.C.'s inpatient care, if offered no community services for
either mental illness or mental retardation when she lived with her
mother or in a personal care home."' In 1995, when she filed suit against
107. See id. at 338.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Penn. Sec'y of Public Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
111. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States in Support of Respondents
at 10, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536) (1999 WL 149653).
112. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at 596, n.8. Only seven states joined an
amicus brief in support of Georgia when the case was heard. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Who are L.C. and E.W.? at http://www.bazelon.org/lcandew.html
(visited Apr. 21, 2000). See also Brief for Respondents at 5-6, Olmstead v. L.C. ex.
rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536) (1999 WL 144128).
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the state for violating the ADA by failing to provide services in the most
integrated setting, L.C. was confined in a locked, acute care psychiatric
hospital although she had been approved for community placement three
years earlier."' She moved to a three-person group home in 1996 and was
116living there in 1999 when the Supreme Court ruled on her case.
Elaine Wilson, who intervened in the case as "E.W.," has mild mental
retardation and brain damage resulting from meningitis. She had been
homeless for twenty years after being discharged from a mental
retardation facility, was repeatedly admitted and discharged from the
psychiatric hospital, and had been placed in personal care homes in the
community that lacked services for mental disabilities. E.W. was
eventually discharged to the same group home as L.C., and was receiving
supportive services in her own apartment at the time the Supreme Court
heard Olmstead.117
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W. argued that the state, having committed itself
to offering both institutional and community mental health services, was
required to serve L.C. and E.W. in the most integrated setting appropriate
to their needs. Because the hospital's treating psychiatrist concluded
that L.C. and E.W. could be served in the community, the state
discriminated against them by failing to move them to a community119
program. The state countered on two points. First, the state argued
that L.C. and E.W. had failed to state a claim for discrimination because
they had not shown that Georgia treated them differently from a
comparable group of non-disabled individuals. Second, the state
contended that treating the women in the community would
fundamentally alter its community program because the state lacked
funding for those services.""
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that
unnecessary segregation of the women in the hospital constituted
discrimination by reason of disability and violated Title II of the ADA.'
The district court rejected the state's fundamental alteration defense,
noting that (1) the services the state's existing program provides in the
115. Brief for Respondents at 6, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No.
98-536).
116. See Who are L.C. and E.W.?, supra note 114, at 1.
117. See id. at 2.
118. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 594.
119. See id. at 593-94.
120. See id. at 594.
121. See id.
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community are the type of services for which L.C. and E.W. qualify, and
(2) the cost of caring for L.C. and E.W. in the community would be
considerably less than the cost of their care in the institution.
12
2
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the finding of
discrimination but remanded for reconsideration of the state's
fundamental alteration defense.12 The appellate court concluded that the
state's cost-based defense should get a more thorough review, but
suggested that the ADA may require Georgia to incur additional costs to
serve L.C. and E.W. in the community unless the state could prove that
the incremental costs would "be so unreasonable given the demands of
the State's mental health budget that it would fundamentally alter the
service.' 24 On remand, the district court held that the additional cost to
the state was not unreasonable in comparison to its total mental health
budget."'
The Supreme Court affirmed that unjustified segregation of individuals
with disabilities is discrimination prohibited by the ADA. 26 The Court
cited both the ADA's findings that identify segregation and isolation as
forms of discrimination and the regulatory mandate to provide services in
the most integrated setting.'27  The Court understood the ADA as
responding to two harms caused by segregation that are tantamount to
discrimination: (1) depriving individuals with disabilities of the benefits of
everyday life in the community, such as social interaction, cultural
pursuits, education and employment, and (2) stigmatizing people with
disabilities by perpetuating an unwarranted belief that they are unable or
unworthy of living in the community."'
The Court rejected the notion that discrimination against people with
disabilities could only exist in relation to treatment of non-disabled
individuals, commenting that Congress had a broader concept of
discrimination in mind when enacting the ADA.9 Nonetheless, the
122. See id. at 594-595.
123. See id. at 595.
124. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d. 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).
125. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at 596 n.7. The state's appeal of the
district court's decision on remand was pending in the Eleventh Circuit at the time
the Supreme Court made its decision. This appeal was subsequently remanded to
the district court in December 1999. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 198 F.3d 1259 (11th
Cir. 1999).
126. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at 597.
127. See id. at 600.
128. See id. at 600-01.
129. See id. at 598.
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Court commented that L.C. and E.W. were treated differently from non-
disabled individuals in obtaining medical care. Because of their mental
disabilities, L.C. and E.W. had to "relinquish participation in community
life" to obtain medical care in an institution while people who do not have
mental disabilities could receive medical services in the community. 3 °
The Olmstead opinion set parameters on its finding that unnecessary
segregation is discrimination. The opinion is careful to assure that the
ADA does not require large scale deinstitutionalization of people with• , 131
mental illness. The state's professionals may determine whether an
individual is capable of living in the community and meets the essential
eligibility requirements of a community program.'32 The ADA does not
require states to offer certain benefits to people with disabilities; it only
requires that services already offered be provided in a non-discriminatory
133manner.
The constitutionality of the ADA was not at issue in the Olmstead
case.13 4 The decision construed the statute and its regulations, without
commenting on their validity.33 This limitation on the holding is
significant because some states have claimed that Title II of the ADA
violates their Eleventh Amendment right to sovereign immunity. This
issue is on the Court's docket for the 2000-2001 term: certiorari has been
granted in University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. Garrett, an
employment case from the Eleventh Circuit."'
130. Id. at 601.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 602.
133. See id. at 603 n.14.
134. See id. at 589.
135. See id. at 592.
136. 193 F. 3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), (cert granted) 120 S.Ct. 1669. Congress
clearly intended the ADA to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suits in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). The findings of the ADA
highlight continuing discrimination against people with disabilities in many areas
typically regulated or administered by states, such as housing, education,
transportation, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting and public
services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). From this, one can infer that Congress
abrogated stateimmunity in response to state discrimination against people with
disabilities. In Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), the
Eighth Circuit found the ADA language inadequate to abrogate state immunity
because it failed to document widespread state discrimination against people with
disabilities. While the ADA clearly states an intent to abrogate state immunity,
and was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth
Circuit found it lacked "congruence and proportionality" to the extent of the
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Olmstead holds that where a state's treatment professionals determine
that an individual can be served in a community program and the person
would prefer community treatment, the state is obligated to serve that
person in the community unless doing so would cause a fundamental
alteration to the community program."' The opinion describes the
parameters of fundamental alteration in Section III-B, in which Justice
Ginsburg was joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer.38 While
this section is dicta, it is influencing the way that advocates, states and the
federal government are responding to this decision. Section III-B would
allow the state to defend against an alleged violation of Title II of the
ADA by contending that "in the allocation of available resources,
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the
responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a
large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities." 3 9
The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
fundamental alteration defense as too limited. The appeals court would
allow the state to compare the costs of serving L.C. and E.W. to its entire
mental health budget. This construction effectively excludes costs from
the fundamental alteration defense because a state is unlikely to
encounter a situation where the costs of serving a few more people would
appear large compared to its overall program budget.4 0 The Court cited
the state's responsibility to make institutional care available to those who
need it and to equitably serve a diverse group of people with . ... 141
To meet these obligations, states need more leeway in demonstrating the
problem of discrimination by state governments against the people with
disabilities. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1005-09. The Eleventh Circuit in Dickson
v. Florida Department of Corrections held to the contrary. Dickson held that the
ADA includes a clear statement of Congressional intent to abrogate immunity,
identifies people with disabilities and a "discrete and insular minority" in need of
Fourteen Amendment protection, and is a proper exercise of congressional power
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dickson v. Fa. Dept. of Corr., 139 F.3d
1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Alsbrook and Dickson during the Spring 2000 term; however, both cases settled
and certiorari was dismissed. See ABA Commission on Mental & Physical
Disability Law, Supreme Court Watches as Parties Play Musical Chairs with ADA
Sovereign Immunity Question, at http://www.abanet.org/disability/reporter/
alert.html (visited Mar. 2, 2000).
137. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
138. See id. at 587.
139. Id. at 604.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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impact of costs in a fundamental alteration defense4
Because Title II and its regulations do not define fundamental
alteration in the context of public benefits, the Court looked to the
"undue hardship" defense used in employment cases. This test requires a
balancing of the cost of the accommodation, size of the program's budget,
and type of operation being conducted by the program. The Court found
the Eleventh Circuit's standard for a fundamental alteration much stricter
than this undue hardship test.
143
The plurality opinion further suggests that a state could legitimately
claim that community placement would fundamentally alter its
community program if: (1) the state has a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with disabilities in community
settings, (2) the waiting list for community services moves at a reasonable
pace, and (3) the movement of the waiting list is not controlled by the
state's desire to keep its institutions fully populated. 44 The movement of
the waiting list can be influenced by the amount of resources available to
the state and the needs of other individuals with disabilities.
1 4
1
II. ANALYSIS: OLMSTEAD CREATES A FRAMEWORK TO RESHAPE
LTC SERVICES, BUT LEAVES A CRITICAL QUESTION UNANSWERED
Olmstead v. L.C. has the potential to reshape the way in which LTC
services are provided, so that community services are favored over
institutional care. The "integration mandate" prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities,146 which the ADA defines to
include both physical and mental impairments.147 Thus, while Olmstead
involves services for people with mental disabilities, the principles
espoused by the ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, apply to
LTC services for any disabled population.
Olmstead balances individual and collective rights to ensure that LTC
programs meet the integration requirements of the ADA. On the one
hand, the decision strengthens the individual's claim for community
placement, while on the other hand it expands the state's defenses against
that claim. The case does not answer the central question: What does
"fundamental alteration" mean in the context of community-based service
142. See id. at 605.
143. See id. at 606 n.16.
144. See id. at 605-06.
145. See id.
146. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
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programs?
A. Strengthening Individual Rights
Two aspects of the Olmstead decision strengthen individual rights: the
declaration that unnecessary segregation equals discrimination and the
requirement that states ensure that any waiting lists for services move at a
reasonable pace. Equating unnecessary segregation with discrimination
creates an entitlement for community treatment services (albeit with
significant limitations). Requiring that waiting lists for community
programs move at a reasonable pace establishes an outcome against which
to measure the effectiveness of a state's efforts to end unnecessary
segregation.
Olmstead is a victory for people with disabilities because it recognizes
the discrimination many have faced through unnecessary segregation.
A long term care system which primarily funds institutional care when
community care is appropriate deliberately segregates people with
disabilities.1 49 "People with severe physical disabilities have been forced
to live in institutional facilities not because they needed segregated
settings... [but] because historically that was the way people with
disabilities were kept out of sight and away from the public.""15 In the
past, courts have minimized the loss of freedom experienced by
individuals who enter institutions, considering it an inevitable
consequence of disability.'51
By linking the ADA finding that segregation is discrimination to the
integration mandate and applying the provisions in tandem to public LTC
programs, Olmstead clearly demonstrates the need to provide services in
the community. The Court's holding that the ADA does not require
states to develop new services or programs seems contrary to these
provisions. If unnecessary segregation is discrimination and services must
be provided in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individual, how could a state justify offering only institutional services to
people who could remain in the community with assistance?
When considered together, the anti-discrimination provision and the
148. See Susan Stefan, ADA Case of the Week 3 at http://www.connix.com/
-narpa/webdoc5.htm (visited Sept. 30, 1999).
149. Amicus Curie Brief of ADAPT, National Council on Independent Living
and TASH in Support of Respondents at 10, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(No. 98-536).
150. Id. at 7-8.
151. See id.
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integration mandate seem to create a limitless entitlement to community
services for qualified individuals with disabilities. The Court limited this
entitlement, however, by allowing the state to raise a cost-based
fundamental alteration defense to the integration mandate. The plurality
opinion in Section III-B of the Olmstead decision suggests that a state
may have a defense against an ADA claim if it has a comprehensive plan
to end unnecessary segregation and any waiting list for community
services moves at a "reasonable pace." '152 Olmstead does not address what
constitutes a "reasonable pace," but lower courts have considered this
question.
In Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare, the state of
Pennsylvania sought to move three people per month from a state
psychiatric hospital to community programs, completing the transition in
three years."' The district court found this progression too slow, agreeing
with the plaintiffs, who recommended moving five people per month for a
transition period of eighteen months. The court based its ruling on past
experience of the state in moving residents out of a different psychiatric
hospital. 5 4 The state appealed the judgment to the Third Circuit, which
urged the parties to settle in light of the decision handed down by
Olmstead.' The settlement agreement allowed the state three additional• 156
months to place members of the plaintiff class in the community. The
152. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1999).
153. See Kathleen S. v. Dept. Public Welfare of Com. of Pa., 10 F. Supp. 2d
460, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
154. See id. at 472.
155. See Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 17 NAT'L DISABILITY L. REP.
93 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
156. See Kathleen S., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 472. In a different context, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a ruling that individuals with developmental disabilities
must receive services within 90 days of being determined eligible for Medicaid. In
Doe v. Chiles the plaintiff class consisted of people with developmental disabilities
who were awaiting services in an [ICF/MR]. Some of the plaintiffs had been on
the waiting list for several years. See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir.
1998). The class relied on a section of Medicaid law that requires states to provide
necessary medical services with "reasonable promptness." 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(8) (2000), cited in Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 711-12. The Eleventh
Circuit agreed that this statutory requirement vested a right in the individual, and
upheld an injunction ordering the state to provide services within 90 days of
disabled applicants becoming eligible for Medicaid. Id. at 718. This case did not
contain an ADA claim, nor does it require community-based services. It is
important because it recognizes a private right of action to enforce Medicaid's
"reasonable promptness" requirement which some people waiting for services can
use in addition to an ADA claim. See id. at 719.
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state's prior experience in deinstitutionalizing people with disabilities is
one factor that can be used to determine a reasonable pace.
While the "reasonable pace" at which a waiting list should move may
be defined on a case-by-case basis, Olmstead's inclusion of this standard
gives disability groups a means by which to measure a state's compliance
with the ADA. If there is a waiting list for state services, the pace at
which the waiting list moves is the measure of whether a state's
comprehensive plan is effective. Advocates can support a claim that a
state has not met Title II's requirements by documenting the length of
time that people with disabilities wait for community services or showing
that community placements can be successfully made at a specific rate.
B. Recognizing the State's Role in Addressing Collective Needs
The Olmstead decision creates only a limited right to community LTC
for people with disabilities. As Justice Ginsburg phrased the issue faced
by the Court, "we confront the question whether the proscription of
discrimination may require placement of persons with mental disabilities
in community settings rather than in institutions. The answer, we hold, is
a qualified yes."' 57 That "qualified yes" means that the individual's right
to community care is treated like a reasonable accommodation - it will be
granted when feasible, given the state's commitment to serve others with
disabilities. Thus, there is a balancing of the needs of the individual and
the collective needs of people with disabilities, with the state as arbiter.
The Court also recognizes a state role in meeting the collective needs of
people with disabilities through publicly funded services by holding that
the Eleventh Circuit offered too limited a fundamental alteration defense.
"To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even
hand, the State must have more leeway than the courts below
[allowed]."' 58 Section 111-B of Olmstead provides this leeway by allowing
states to develop and implement comprehensive plans to expand
community programs. This permits the state to determine how it will
meet its ADA requirements through policy, rather than through
litigation. In an amicus brief supporting Georgia in Olmstead, states
asserted their responsibility for determining the appropriate mix of
settings where services are provided to people with disabilities: the ADA
does not reflect Congressional intent to "usurp the states' prerogative to
make these fundamental policy decisions themselves."'5 9 The states were
157. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
158. Id. at 605.
159. Amicus Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners at 9,
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concerned that Helen L. and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Olmstead
created a possibility that "[p]iecemeal litigation rather than planning may
now determine the manner in which services will be provided to
individuals with disabilities. ' ' 60 The United States Attorney General
agreed that "nothing in the ADA suggests that courts must ignore the
States' legitimate administrative concerns in accomplishing the transition
of eligible individuals from institutional to community-based care....
States will need to locate appropriate community placements and
determine which eligible individuals should receive priority for available
slots. 1 61  If the state makes its decisions in accordance with a
comprehensive state plan, an institutionalized individual could not use
litigation against the state as a means of "jumping" to the top of the
waiting list for community services.16
C. What is a "Fundamental Alteration?"
Prior to the Olmstead decision, the fundamental alteration defense was
used in situations where the individual with disabilities was not
"qualified" for the program without a reasonable modification to the
program. Easley found a fundamental alteration of a program where the
accommodation needed by the applicant would be at complete odds with
program objectives. To determine whether the accommodation
amounted to a fundamental alteration, the court closely examined the
statutory and programmatic purposes and benefits of the program,1
giving some deference to the state's characterization of the population to
be served, services provided and program goals. A fundamental
alteration, therefore, would be found when admitting an individual to the
program would require the state to modify policies to the point where the
purposes of the program would no longer be met.
The lesson from Helen L. is that there is no fundamental alteration of a
program where placement of a qualified individual in the community
violates state restrictions on how money may be allocated. The inability
of the administering agency to reallocate program funds was of no
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536).
160, Id. at 8.
161. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, supra note 111, at 22.
162. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999).
163. See Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 304 (3rd Cir. 1994).
164. See Easley, 36 F.3d at 302-304. It is hard to distinguish this test from one
where the focus is on whether or not the applicant is a "qualified" individual with
a disability, i.e., do they meet the eligibility criteria that are necessary to enjoy the
full benefits of the program. See id. at 302.
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consequence to the Third Circuit. The community placement fit within
165the stated purposes of the program, if not within its budget.
Olmstead allows states to apply the fundamental alteration defense
when a qualified individual with a disability asserts her right to treatment
in the most integrated setting. The decision adopts the Attorney
General's interpretation of the integration mandate, making the
individual's right to placement in the most integrated setting subject to the
reasonable modification requirement when "such placement would...
require an unreasonable change in state policy or a fundamental change
in the state's treatment program[.]" ' 66  The reasonable modification
language of Title II is no longer limited to the definition of "qualified
individual with disabilities," but now applies to the integration mandate as
well.
Olmstead adopts this interpretation in dicta, because the plurality is
concerned about the expense states will incur if they must provide both
community and institutional care."' Olmstead suggests that a
fundamental alteration of a state's program would exist if "in the
allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would
be inequitable, given the responsibility the state has undertaken for the
care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with
mental disabilities."'1 68 The Court is sympathetic to the states' concern
about the cost of providing community services, and fears that if forced to
offer immediate relief, states would close institutions without providing
appropriate community care.
The state amici in Olmstead argued that limited fiscal resources
preclude states from providing community-based services for all. . 169
individuals with disabilities. While community-based services are
generally considered less costly than institutional care on a per capita
basis, states may experience increased costs in the aggregate when moving
people from institutions to community-based programs.' 7° The increased
costs arise when the state moves many people into the community but is
then unable to consolidate or close its institutions. 17  The states were
concerned that they would have to keep institutions open for those who
165. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3rd Cir. 1995), (cert. denied
sub nom.) Penn. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
166. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, supra note 111, at 9.
167. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604.
168. Id.
169. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the States, supra note 159, at 4.
170. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, supra note 111, at 21.
171. See id.
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need such care, while increasing spending on community-based care "until
some unknown point at which there is a 'fundamental alteration' to its
programs.', 7 2 The plurality opinion in Olmstead found it unlikely that a
state could ever prevail under this construction of the fundamental
alteration defense.
73
Olmstead holds that a fundamental alteration would exist if the state
had to create a new community-based program to offer services in the
most integrated setting.1 74  As interpreted by the Second Circuit in
Rodriguez v. City of New York, Olmstead does not require states to add a
new benefit to an existing program. In Rodriguez, the appellate court
overturned a decision in which people with mental impairments were
granted a permanent injunction against the New York Medicaid program
under an ADA claim. The plaintiffs argued that New York discriminated
against people with mental impairments in its personal care programS176
because it did not provide safety monitoring as a service. The Second
Circuit reasoned that safety monitoring was a new benefit needed to allow
a new population (those with mental impairments) into an existing
program for people with physical disabilities.' In essence, the addition of
a new benefit and new population would create a new program.
From the state's perspective, the legislative parameters governing the
program may be considered fundamental to the nature of the program. In
172. Amicus Curiae Brief of the States, supra note 159, at 8.
173. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999).
174. See id. at 603 n.14. See also, Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States,
supra note 111, at 20.
175. 197 F.3d 611, 619 (2nd Cir. 1999), (cert. denied), - S. Ct. __, 2000 WL
869366 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000) (No. 99-1240).
176. See id. at 613. The plaintiffs in Rodriguez were people with cognitive
impairments, including Alzheimer's Disease, who could not be left safely alone at
home. The service they requested, "safety monitoring," would allow a caregiver
to remain in their home to provide supervision, but without providing personal
care tasks. Id. at 614. New York's personal care services include "some or total
assistance with personal hygiene, dressing and feeding; nutritional and
environmental support functions; and health-related tasks." Id. at 613. The
plaintiffs argued that New York discriminated against people with mental
disabilities by providing personal care services that were adequate to allow people
with physical disabilities to live at home, but were inadequate for people with
mental disabilities because they lacked the safety monitoring this group needs to
live at home. Id. at 614. The Second Circuit disagreed, commenting that the
ADA does not require states to provide a certain level of benefits to people with
disabilities. Olmstead's holding is limited to requiring non-discrimination in the
services the state chooses to provide. Id. at 619.
177. See id. at 618.
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the case of Medicaid HCBS waivers, for example, the state's ability to
restrict the size of the program and limit the cost of services provided is
very different from the rest of the Medicaid program. Are these factors
fundamental to the nature of the HCBS waiver program? Olmstead does
not reach this question, perhaps because Georgia operated its waiver
program at one-third of its capacity.17 This question is likely to arise,
however, as plaintiffs challenge such program characteristics as eligibility
requirements related to severity of disability, 79 placement or exclusion
based upon dual diagnosis,8 and limits on the cost of community care
relative to nursing home care."'
III. OLMSTEAD IS NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT, TO REFOCUS
THE PUBLIC LTC SYSTEM
Policymakers are taking seriously Olmstead's statement that unjustified
isolation in an institution is discrimination. President Clinton welcomed
the decision, saying "I am pleased that the Supreme Court decision ...
upholds the purposes of the ADA by recognizing that unjustified isolation
of institutionalized persons with disabilities is prohibited discrimination.
This decision will increase access to home- and community-based long
term care services and support of these persons. '" State policymakers
have declared their intentions to comply with the integration mandate18
but have also expressed concern about the potential cost of expanding
178. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. at 601.
179. See Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (cited in
Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F.Supp. 524, 529 (D. Md. 1996) ("question of material
fact whether plaintiffs were excluded from community based programs solely by
reason of the severity of their handicaps.")
180. See King v. Weil, 92-M-2409 (D. Colo. 1996) cited in Memorandum from
Elizabeth Priaulx at http://www.protectionandadvocacy.com/attachc.htm (visited
July 19, 1999).
181. See Charles M. v. Gilbert (W.D. Tex. 1998)(where plaintiff was denied
HCBS waiver services because the cost of his care would exceed the cost of
nursing home care) cited in Amicus Curiae Brief of the States, supra note 159, at
5.
182. President Clinton on Supreme Court's Olmstead Decision, June 23, 1999
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) http://www.connix.coml-narpa/clinton.olmstead.htm.
183. See Olmstead Progress Report: Disability Advocates Assess State
Implementation After One Year 2 at http://www.protectionandadvocacy
.com/progressreportfinal.htm (visited Aug. 2, 2000). "[S]tates are generally aware
of the decision and express their intention to comply ... [but] implementation
efforts are sluggish at best." Id.
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community-based services.
Action to end the institutional bias in the LTC system is occurring
slowly. In the year following the Olmstead decision, individuals and
organizations filed more than 150 complaints with the federal government
alleging that state governments are not providing services to people with
disabilities in the most integrated setting. I" The federal government has
responded to Olmstead by investigating these complaints and by
encouraging states to develop comprehensive plans to expand the
availability of community-based services.
Although Olmstead's suggestion that states develop comprehensive
plans for ending unnecessary institutionalization appears in dicta,
advocates and some states have followed the Court's recommendation.
As of July 26, 2000, the tenth anniversary of the ADA and the date some
advocacy groups had set for all states to develop comprehensive plans,'
17
seven states had an executive order or law in place to require an Olmstead
plan by a specific date.' States have focused their implementation efforts
primarily on people with developmental disabilities, rather than
concentrating on those in institutions or at risk for institutionalization
regardless of the type of disability."' Thirty-four states increased funding
for HCBS in the year following the Olmstead decision; however,
advocates attribute these increases to prior commitments and other
reasons unrelated to Olmstead.1'9 The public proclamations of federal and
state policymakers and advocacy groups indicate a change in attitude
resulting from Olmstead, but the institutional bias in the LTC delivery
184. See Medicaid: Program Spending Second Largest Expense for 2000 State
Budgets, NGA Says, 8 BNA's HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT 84 (2000). The
National Governors' Association noted that Medicaid expenditures could rise if
implementing the Olmstead decision results in increasing numbers of people with
disabilities receiving LTC services in the community. See id.
185. See State Medicaid Director Letter - Olmstead Update No: 2 2 at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smd72500.htm (visited July 26, 2000).
186. See id. at 3.
187. See National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems,
Nationwide Olmstead v. L.C. Campaign: Read on to Learn How You Can
Participate at http://www.protectionandadvocacy.com/actiplan.htm (visited Oct.
12, 1999).
188. See Olmstead Progress Report: Disability Advocates Assess State
Implementation After One Year 5 at http://www.protectionandadvocacy.com/
progressreportfinal.htm (Aug. 2, 2000). The seven states were Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina and Texas. See id.
189. See id. at 4.
190. See id. at 6.
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system has not been corrected.
Olmstead offers states an opportunity to implement the ADA's
integration mandate in an orderly fashion. If the Court simply rejected
the possibility of the state using a cost-based fundamental alteration
defense, it would have created an immediate, individual entitlement to
community-based services. The Court recognizes, however, that state
HCBS programs currently lack the capacity needed to serve all qualified
individuals with disabilities in the community and feared states would
move people to the community without providing essential services. The
plurality's moderate position creates an individual entitlement, but allows
states to fulfill their duties by developing comprehensive plans and
implementing them over a reasonable time period. The Court's decision
is reasonable - too reasonable to end the institutional bias in long term
care. This decision alone will not ensure that people with disabilities
receive LTC services in the most integrated setting.
The impact of Olmstead is limited because it operates within the
context of a biased LTC system. The Court referenced the institutional
bias in Medicaid in the past tense, noting the availability of HCBS
waivers) 9. ' Although HCBS waivers have been available for two
decades,"9 and in some states the programs are quite large,"' they operate
under statutory language intended to create demonstration projects rather
than sustain service delivery systems. State action alone will not end the
institutional bias in Medicaid.
Olmstead's promise to end unnecessary institutionalization will be
fulfilled only if states dramatically expand community-based programs.
There are many things states can do to expand HCBS under current
Medicaid law: adopt the Medicaid personal care option; operate HCBS
waivers statewide; increase the number of people served through HCBS
waivers; expand rehabilitation services; provide targeted case
management to people who want to leave institutions; and elect the more
generous financial eligibility criteria available under current law. 94
191. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999).
192. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., supra note 46, at 384.
193. For example, in 1998, California served 35,105 people in its MR/DD
waiver, Indiana served 28,563 in its Elderly and Disabled waivers, Missouri served
38,946 in its Elderly waiver, New York served 31,000 in its MR/DD waiver and
18,649 in its Aged/Disabled waiver, Oregon served 29,119 in its Aged/Disabled
waiver (1997 figures), and Texas served 24,045 in its Aged/Disabled waiver. See
Nagy and Partridge, supra note 36, at 25.
194. See generally Harrington, supra note 35; Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, supra note 66.
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However, states have had these options for years but have not chosen to
use them.
Congress should offer a stronger incentive for states to move beyond
planning and into expansion of community-based programs. The best
policy option would be a mandatory long-term care benefit that entitles
people to services, not settings, as proposed in MiCASSA. Rather than
an entitlement to nursing home, ICF/MR or community-based services,
people with disabilities would be entitled to long-term care services and
could choose where to live. Given the lack of congressional interest in
long-term care, and high cost estimates generally associated with LTC
proposals,"' an incremental approach is more politically feasible.
Congress should add an HCBS option to the Medicaid program: once a
state chose the option it would create a state-wide entitlement to a broad
array of community-based services for people with disabilities, like the
package proposed in the Feingold bill. The goal of the HCBS option is to
implement Olmstead by allowing states to provide community services on
par with Medicaid nursing home and ICF/MR services. This proposal
does not address the broader issue of reforming LTC policy to meet the. .. 196
needs of all people with disabilities.
Like existing HCBS waivers, the HCBS option would target people
needing institutional level of care, provide a wide range of supportive
services, and use the more generous institutional financial eligibility
criteria. Like the existing personal care option, the HCBS option would
create an entitlement to services and would be available without a waiver.
The proposed HCBS option should be offered in addition to existing
HCBS waivers so that states could expand community services
incrementally, if necessary. States with HCBS waivers serving small
numbers of people or limited geographic areas could expand services
gradually through the waiver then move to the entitlement when they
have the capacity to serve all qualified individuals. Maintaining HCBS
waivers also retains the demonstration nature of waivers so that states
could develop new services for specific populations as the need arose.
Like the Feingold and MiCASSA bills, the HCBS option would be
limited to people requiring institutional level of care. However, the
195. The Congressional Budget Office priced an earlier version of MiCASSA
at $20 billion per year. See Home-Based Care Legislation Picks Up Bipartisan
Support, OLDER AMERICANS REPORT, (Mar.20, 1998) at 99.
196. This Comment suggests modification of current federal law to address
the institutional bias that must be overcome to implement the Olmstead decision.
The broader reforms required to provide adequate LTC services to all people who
need them are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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HCBS option should not be limited to those who "would otherwise be
served in an institution" because this current limitation precludes states
from serving people with serious mental illness in community settings.19
Rather, the HCBS option would allow states to target services to
individuals with severe physical disabilities, serious mental illness, or
severe/profound mental retardation. The state could choose to provide
HCBS to one or more of these groups, or people with dual diagnoses
across groups.
To create a real choice between community and institutional services
within the Medicaid program, the HCBS option needs to eliminate the
cost-neutrality requirement of existing waivers. This creates an open-
ended entitlement, such as that for nursing home or ICF/MR care, where
the state must purchase services for all eligible individuals. The problem
is that Congress is unlikely to enact, or many states to adopt, an option
that has no cost limitations. The sentiment that costs must be considered
permeates the Olmstead case. It is evident in the state's argument that the
cost of serving qualified people in the community is a fundamental
alteration of its programs, in the Attorney General's application of
reasonable modification language to the integration mandate, and in the
plurality's utilization of the undue hardship balancing test when
considering the fundamental alteration defense.
MiCASSA's "quasi-entitlement" offers the best compromise on the
cost issue at this point in time. When spending on community care
exceeds the cost of serving the same group of people in an institution, the
state chooses whether and how to limit costs. Some states would likely
choose to close enrollment in the program and start a waiting list. Others
might refuse community placement to people whose cost of care would be
lower in an institution. A few might choose not to limit costs and to offer
a real entitlement.
Borrowing from the Feingold and MiCASSA bills, the HCBS option
proposes to improve equity in the Medicaid statute's treatment of
institutional and community services. The HCBS option would allow
people with physical or mental disabilities who are eligible for
institutional services in the state to choose community care instead.
197. This change would add a new benefit to the Medicaid program:
community mental health services for adults who would otherwise be served in a
psychiatric facility. While the federal government would face increased
community service costs, it would not bear the expense of institutional psychiatric
care for adults with mental illness. The provision creates a strong incentive for
states to expand community-based mental health services, with federal matching
funds, and to reduce state-funded institutional care.
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Financial eligibility criteria would be the same for institutional or HCBS
option services. The option would allow states to offer a wide array of
services and to target services to specific populations. The option adopts
MiCASSA's quasi-entitlement and punts the cost issue to the states.
CONCLUSION
Title II of the ADA requires states to provide services for people with
disabilities in the most integrated setting. Olmstead interprets this
requirement to mean that when a state offers both institutional and
community-based services, an individual who is qualified for both
programs and prefers community services must be provided those services
unless doing so would require a fundamental alteration of the program.
Fundamental alteration is not defined by Olmstead, but the decision
allows states to assert a defense based on the cost of serving a diverse
group of people with disabilities in addition to the plaintiffs. A plurality
of the Court suggests that the test could be whether a state is effectively
implementing a comprehensive plan to ensure integration. This
formulation carefully balances individual rights with the state's
responsibility to provide a wide range of services for a heterogenous
group of people with disabilities.
While the Court is sensitive to state concerns about costs, the extent of
the Medicaid bias toward institutional care is glossed over by the decision
and limits the likelihood of compliance with the ADA as construed by
Olmstead. Congress should amend the Medicaid program to allow states
to offer HCBS without the limitations of existing waivers. An HCBS
option would allow states to create an entitlement to community services
for people who meet the qualifications for institutional care. Such an
entitlement would offer individuals with disabilities a real opportunity to
obtain services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
Only where this occurs will Olmstead's promise to end unnecessary
segregation be kept.
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